NamID Call

Call one name from another

No phone numbers. Sign in as your name, type the name you want to call.

Have a code from your other device?

On a computer where you are signed in, press “Use this name on my phone”. Scan that code with this phone's camera, or paste the link here.

How a call finds you

Caller’s browser signed in as theirname.xch 1 · who can I reach at yourname.x? NamID name directory the relay address and the call key that yourname.x published 2 · the call setup is sealed to that key NamID relay holds the sealed envelope for up to 90 seconds, and cannot read it 3 · carried to every page yourname.x has open yourname.x’s browser the private half of the call key is here and nowhere else 4 · after she answers The two devices, directly voice and video, not through the relay the registry checks this deed before it accepts a call key On chain · yourname.x’s deed the coin that says which key holds the name. The call key is not in it.
How a call finds a person. The directory and the relay are NamID servers, not the chain. The only part of this you can open in the explorer is the deed that says who holds the name.

What each step does

Three different things happen here and only one of them touches the chain. Each step says which it is.

  1. The name already exists on chain on chain A name is a coin on the chain — its deed. The deed carries the key that holds the name and the hash the name’s records are committed under. It was made when the name was registered. Nothing on this page creates or changes it. This is the one part of calling you can open in the explorer.
  2. You sign in as the name a signature Your wallet signs a challenge the registry issues for this name. The registry checks that signature against the key in the deed above, so the name you are signed in as is proved rather than typed. No coin is spent and no transaction is sent. A signature is not a transaction.
  3. This browser makes a call key neither A key pair is generated here, in this browser. The private half stays on this device. Only the public half ever leaves it, and that is the half other people need in order to seal a call to you. Nothing is sent anywhere at this point, so there is nothing yet to look up.
  4. You publish the public half a signature That is what Publish this device’s call key does. One signature over a challenge for this name, and the registry writes the public half, your relay address and any routing keys into its name directory. From that moment anyone can look your name up and seal a call to you. This is a write to the registry’s own directory, not a transaction. It is not an on-chain event and it does not appear in the explorer.
  5. A page opens a line neither While this page is open it holds a line at the relay for thirty minutes, and hands the relay a key for this tab alone. A caller seals one copy of each message to every key your name has, so a laptop and a phone both ring. The relay keeps these keys in memory only. They are gone when it restarts, and this page hands them over again.
  6. Someone calls your name neither The caller looks your name up, seals the call setup to your keys and posts it to the relay, which holds it for at most ninety seconds. Once you answer, voice and video go straight between the two devices. No part of a call is written to the chain, and the relay deliberately keeps nothing. There is no record of who called whom.

Why the call key is not on the chain

Publishing a call key is a signature and a write to the registry’s own name directory. The directory is what makes your name callable straight away.

The design intends a second, on-chain step: the hash of that service record committed into the name’s records, so a caller could check the published key against the chain rather than trusting the registry. That step is not available yet — the registry accepts five kinds of record (address, profile, socials, DNS and agent card) and refuses this one, so there is nothing a wallet could sign for it today.

Until it exists, a published call key is a claim by the registry that the name’s holder signed for it. The signature is real and is checked against the deed. What is missing is the part a third party could verify without asking the registry.